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William James is well-known for arguing that different words which describe the 
same practical state of affairs are, in fact, equivalent in meaning.  This theory of meaning 
is one important strain of American pragmatism, the movement which remains America’s 
primary philosophical contribution to intellectual history, and it invites us to consider a 
unique perspective on the contemporary dialogue between science and religion.  
Specifically, it raises the question of the necessity of philosophical foundations when 
there is practical agreement.   
This paper argues that when practical agreement can be reached there are certain 
purposes for which philosophical foundations can be strategically ignored.  For certain 
purposes, our concern should be to explore whether an imperative to other-regarding 
behavior can be grounded on both naturalistic and metaphysical premises.   It is therefore 
at times prudent to abstract from divisive questions of philosophical foundations and 
focus on the practical consensus that can potentially be forged regarding the desirability 
of other-regarding behavior.  Put bluntly, if a case for traditionally ethical, other-
regarding, behavior can be made with or without traditional metaphysical underpinnings, 
then there are contexts in which it is best to make do without addressing the metaphysical 
question. 
As a deliberately challenging “test case” the paper examines the work of biologist 
David Sloan Wilson and philosopher Eliot Sober in juxtaposition with a traditional 
account of Christian love.  This paper attempts to provide a realistic assessment of the 
extent to which these two perspectives on altruism can provide similar accounts of 
desirable behavior, arguing finally that much practical agreement exists.  To the extent 
that practical agreement can be negotiated, in this case and others, the paper argues that 
the divisive issue of philosophical foundations should be de-emphasized.  
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In the second chapter of William James’ Pragmatism, James begins with an 
entertaining, if not mildly disturbing, anecdote about a philosophical dispute.   During a 
camping trip, James returns from a solitary ramble to find the group vigorously debating 
whether a man chasing a squirrel around a tree could be said to “go around” the squirrel: 
“This human witness tries to get sight of the squirrel by moving rapidly around the tree, 
but no matter how fast he goes,” James writes “the squirrel moves as fast in the opposite 
direction . . . The resultant metaphysical problem now is this: Does the man go round the 
squirrel or not? . .  Which party is right, I said, depends upon what we practically mean 
by going ‘round the  squirrel’ ”  (James, 1975).  James goes on to demonstrate what we 
might have suspected ourselves, that this is merely a verbal dispute, and that once the 
meaning of the term “around” is clarified through an explanation of its practical 
consequences, the difficulty evaporates: 
 
The pragmatic method is primarily a method of settling metaphysical 
disputes that otherwise might be interminable.  Is the world one or many?-
-fated or free?--material or spiritual--here are notions either of which may 
or may not hold good of the world; and disputes over such notions are 
unending.  The pragmatic method in such cases is to try to interpret each 
notion by tracing its respective practical consequences.  What difference 
would it practically make to anyone if this notion rather than the other 
notion were true?  If no practical difference whatever can be traced, then 
the alternatives mean practically the same thing, and all dispute it idle. 
(ibid.) 
 
The problem of philosophical foundations in the science and religion dialogue is 
not trivial, and it is not merely verbal.  It is a serious difficulty which involves basic 
philosophical questions, questions which, in many cases, can be seen as variations on the 
essential questions of the history of philosophy.  The claim I would like to make in this 
paper is not that the search for philosophical foundations is unimportant or unnecessary, 
but that for certain purposes, including a number of non-trivial purposes, it can, and 
perhaps should, be ignored.  To the question: “Are philosophical foundations necessary 
for the science and religion dialogue?” my answer will be, “It depends.”  It depends upon 
the purpose and the context of the inquiry.   
On the one hand, for the purposes of theory, philosophical foundations are surely 
necessary.   Most disciplines of human thought function within the space of explicit or 
implicit philosophical foundations.  These foundations are not, as the metaphor suggests, 
Cartesian building blocks upon which the discipline is methodically built, but functional 
assumptions which make it possible for those within the discipline to discern “what 
counts” as evidence for a truth claim.  These foundations need not be articulated in 
advance of the pursuit; they may evolve or change radically as the discipline requires; 
and their character as philosophical assumptions may even be denied.  But they are there, 
and their reality is evidenced by both the specific agreements that are reached within 
disciplines and the fundamental disagreements that often exist between disciplines.   If 
only as an attempt to remove obstacles to effective cross-disciplinary communication, the 
continued pursuit of shared philosophical foundations is essential.  For this reason alone, 
the attempt to articulate a theoretical framework by which theologians, biologists, 
physicists and philosophers can communicate is of the first importance. 
  But for most people—and, I suspect, even for most of us--the search for 
philosophical foundations is more than just a theoretical pursuit.  This creates a problem. 
The problem that arises is that while the community of human inquirers can wait 
generations upon generations for adequate cross-disciplinary foundations, each of us, 
individually, as finite human beings, cannot.  We must make practical choices.  Either 
consciously or by default each of us must make a single basic decision, the answer to 
which will solve many of our day-to-day practical dilemmas in advance:  “What sort of 
person should I be?”  Or, in pragmatic terms, “How shall I treat my fellow human 
beings?”  The answer to this question cannot wait for interdisciplinary consensus about 
philosophical foundations.  And for those of us who are also educators, the stakes are 
even higher.  We are charged with a significant portion of the responsibility for assisting 
the younger members of our community in making this basic decision.  Students in the 
United States are likely to come to college with values they have learned through a 
religious tradition.  Many of them sense that they are faced with a choice between, on the 
one hand, science or religion or, on the other hand, living in an uneasy “intellectual 
schizophrenia”-- believers one day a week, hard-headed empiricists from Monday to 
Friday.   Again, they are not in position to wait for the intellectual community to 
synthesize diverse religious traditions and the empirical sciences into a tidy digestible 
package.   
This paper is written for the person inside of each of us who is not a theorist.  I 
suppose, to be perfectly honest, it is written for the person inside of me who is not a 
theorist.  For this person, and for those of us who are also educators, I would like to offer 
the following humble Jamesian observation:  It is of profound importance if some 
recommendation to other-regarding or pro-social behavior can be grounded 
independently on both naturalistic and metaphysical premises.   Independent but 
reasonably harmonious conclusions about desirable behavior can be established while, 
for practical purposes, abstracting from the difficult and divisive question of which set of 
premises is correct.  Put bluntly, if a case for some traditionally ethical, other-regarding 
behavior can be made from disciplines with different philosophical foundations, then we 
are in position to answer our practical question without addressing the question of 
broader philosophical foundations.  If a naturalist and a theologian can both agree about 
the importance of pro-social behavior, they have reached a practical consensus from 
different philosophical starting points.  And from the point of view of a pragmatist, for 
certain purposes, this may be good enough.  Indeed, it is, for the moment, the best we can 
do. 
The basic claim of this paper is philosophical.   It is a suggestion about how we 
should think about the idea of reconciliation between science and religion for the 
purposes of practice and education.  In order to illustrate how this method may produce 
tangible outcomes, I would like to address the topic of pro-social behavior in light of both 
the Christian tradition and evolutionary biology.  Needless to say, what follows will be 
very incomplete, premised on brief accounts of agape-love and some influential work in 
evolutionary biology.  But the value of the suggestion, if it has any, does not stand or fall 
with the “test case” which follows.  Indeed, I suspect that an easier case for my claim 
about method could have been made by appealing to work which documents the 
psychological and physiological benefits of pro-social behavior without raising the 
challenges that evolutionary biology surely must.  If the pragmatic method can bear even 
some fruit on this rugged terrain, however, perhaps it will have proven its fitness for 
other challenges.  
James’ pragmatic method is at times employed in a somewhat positivistic manner 
(as it was, initially, applied by its original author, Charles Peirce), appealing primarily to 
the external consequences of beliefs or ideas.  It is also at times employed with an 
emphasis on internal consequences, the practical psychological consequences of beliefs 
or ideas.  My analysis is skewed towards the first, somewhat cruder, approach.  What sort 
of behavior is implied by a commitment to the ideal of Christian love?  Are there any 
biologically premised arguments which recommend such behavior for its fitness 
consequences?  Once we have addressed this question, we can then address the question 
of motive.  I will offer my apologia for such a strategy in the concluding section.  
 
 
A Pragmatic Assessment of Christian Love 
 
 
The basic organization of this section is as follows: 
 
(1) If we temporarily abstract from the question of motive, we can examine a pragmatic 
account of what it means, in terms of external behavior, to be committed to a basic 
Christian ethical principle. 
(2) Such practice is, to a substantial extent, equivalent to practices that have been shown 
to be advantageous, under certain conditions, in terms of fitness consequences. 
(3) It is then possible to address the issue of motive and argue for the likelihood that 
genuine altruistic desires may be partly to explain for the positive fitness consequences. 
  
The noun "agape" is a derivative of the Greek verb agapan which is suggestive of a 
"respectful or unselfish love"  (Viard, 1979).1 Christian writers have traditionally emphasized a 
semantic continuity between its vernacular usage and the Greek translators' usage of agapan 
and agape in the Septuagint, noting in particular that agapan was likely chosen because of its 
semantic similarity to the Hebrew hesed and its semantic difference from the Greek eros.   In 
the Septuagint we have the beginning of the history of the Judeo-Christian usage of agapan and 
agape--the verb appears two-hundred times and the noun appears forty times.  It is with the 
Christian writings of the first century--most famously in Matthew's claim that the law may be 
                                                 
1 James Barr, who is generally suspicious of reading theological meanings back into 
etymological origins, agrees: agapan "existed in Greek as early as Homer and already in 
classical times was used with senses quite close to those found in the [Septuagint] and the New 
Testament"  (Barr, 1987, p. 8).  
summarized in the commandment of agape (Mt. 22:37-40) and in John's claim that God is 
agape (1 Jn. 4:16)--that agape becomes synonymous with Christianity.  As Barr notes, whereas 
agapan in the Septuagint may have denoted not only nurturing love but also erotic love, agape, 
in the New Testament, is unequivocal:  The paradigm of agape in the New Testament is the 
love of the Christian God for his creation.   
A pragmatic account of the meaning of Christian agape asks, “What sort of 
practical effects would we expect to observe if someone were committed to agape as a 
central ethical principle?”  Numerous interpretations have been offered.  Important strains 
of Christianity have recommended everything from self-preference to self-denial (cf. 
Hallett, 1989).   Because of the nature of this analysis, however, it is not necessary to 
converge on a single articulation of Christian love.  In fact, it suits our purposes better to 
provide two possible interpretations of Christian love. We will then be in position to see 
how robust and rich a version of agapic love can be recommended on purely biological 
grounds.   
For the sake of our analysis, I will distinguish two models of agapic behavior: (i) 
agape expressed as a commitment to justice, and (ii) agape expressed as a commitment to 
mercy.    
(i)  A commitment to agape as justice means, in practical terms, that the 
individual is committed to a combination of altruism and fairness.  She is disposed to act 
altruistically, which is to say that she is willing to act in a pro-social manner and risk 
being exploited, in the short-term, for the sake of creating trusting relationships and 
engaging in pro-social behavior with others.  She is honest and helpful when she 
encounters others, and she gives complete strangers the benefit of the doubt.  She does 
not envy others.  Her commitment to fairness, however, means that she not willing to be 
taken advantage of repeatedly. If she is wronged, she withdraws her cooperativeness.  If, 
however, the guilty party expresses repentance through action, she is quick to forgive. 
This is, no doubt, not the most generous description of agapic behavior that could 
be offered, but it is still substantially pro-social.  In fact, we have probably set a practical 
standard that many people do not meet.  Restraint from deception and anti-social 
behavior coupled with a preference for genuinely pro-social behavior is indeed a standard 
by which many of us would not wish to be judged.  Consider what is rejected by such a 
disposition.  Someone committed to agape as fairness does not cheat on her taxes; she 
honors agreements, both personal and financial, such as marriage or employment 
contracts.  She tells cashiers when they have given her change on a twenty rather than a 
ten.  She tips for good service, and she doesn’t steal cable television.  How many of us 
can still be said to possesses even this agapic disposition once its pragmatic consequences 
are clarified?   At the risk of incrimination, I will confess that in the social environment 
where my values were formed—the north Bronx--such a disposition would kiddingly, but 
tellingly, be referred to as “saintly.”    
Agape as justice, once given pragmatic meaning, is a thinly veiled personification 
of the famous game theory strategy TIT-FOR-TAT.  TIT-FOR-TAT, recall, is the 
successful strategy for the iterated Prinsoner’s Dilemma invented by Anatol Rapoport.  In 
evolutionary game theory, this strategy has a preference for altruistic behavior.  TFT 
begins each interaction as an altruist and then copies its partner’s strategy.  Groups of 
cooperators turn out to be more fit than groups of selfish actors, but selfish actors do best 
when they can exploit altruists.   TFT does not exploit others (i.e. it begins new 
interactions as trustworthy).  It assumes, provisionally, that others are trustworthy.  It 
does not like being exploited  (it retaliates when “deceived”) and it is willing to trust 
again, provisionally, when others “apologize” for past transgressions through pro-social 
actions.   Sober and Wilson point out that the Iterated Prisoners Dilemma is an 
experiment about groups of individuals (Sober and Wilson, 1998).  Of course the classic 
difficulty with group selection is that altruists within the groups are subject to 
exploitation from selfish individuals.  TFT, as a moderately altruistic strategy, is 
somewhat vulnerable to exploitation.  This, again, has nothing to do with motive.  It is 
significant to realize that while group selection is sometimes invokes as an explanation of 
the evolution of altruism, multi-level selection theory does not itself require 
psychological altruism.  Although group selection is one possible explanation of how 
psychological altruism could have evolved, group selection does not require motives or 
“minds” at all.  It simply requires vehicles of fitness that are the primary explanation for 
the fate of some group of lower order units.  The moral, irrespective of motive, is that 
groups of altruists can out-compete selfish groups depending upon the frequency of the 
altruistic trait.   
But TFT is obviously a very simple strategy operating in a very artificial 
environment.  What happens when we add social mechanisms that are more reflective of 
actual social contexts?  In a 2002 article Sober and Wilson create a model of behavioral 
disposition which fits well with our pragmatic analysis.  The “helpful nature” is the 
person with a disposition to engage in pro-social behavior, behavior that is consistent 
with our commitment to agape as justice: “people who do not exploit others, who avoid 
being exploited, and who punish exploiters” are “helpful natures”  (Wilson and Sober 
2002, 189).   The category “helpful nature” is neutral with respect to motive.  We do not 
know if a helpful nature’s altruistic desires are ultimate or instrumental.   But we do 
know that a helpful nature will act in a way consistent with our agape as justice model 
with or without an environment of social control.  In other words, the helpful nature is not 
opportunistic.  She is not continually maximizing self-interest. What is important about 
this category for us is that when a helpful nature is an environment of strong social 
controls, he or she will actually out-compete “unhelpful natures.”   Someone exhibiting a 
disposition consistent with our first category of agapic commitment will out-compete 
people who are willing to exploit others (people who fail to meet the pragmatic 
requirements of agape as justice).   According to Sober and Wilson this could be for at 
least three reasons: First, unhelpful natures who cannot predict the presence and 
relevance of social controls perfectly will probably be punished.   Second, unhelpful 
natures need to continually monitor their social environment for the presence of social 
controls.  Third, because, in part, of reasons one and two, unhelpful natures may be 
punished preemptively before they have the opportunity to exploit again. The point Sober 
and Wilson make is consistent with common sense: in an environment of social control 
(including, we would assume, both state sponsored punishers and informal punishments 
based on reputation) helpful natures should, more often than not, out-compete unhelpful 
natures.    
In sum, there is reason to believe that our first model of agape is an evolutionary 
successful strategy.  It performs reasonably well in a vacuum, and even better when we 
account for a common condition of human social environments.  The “helpful nature” is, 
in the right conditions, a good evolutionary strategy. 
(ii)  Agape as mercy:  Agape as mercy is defined by the Christian maxim to “love 
the enemy” or “turn the other cheek”.   This actor is altruistic and disposed to pro-social 
behavior just like the first, but his altruism is less conditional.  In terms of patterns of 
behavior, we would expect this actor to be trustworthy and honest—like his 
predecessor—but he exceeds the standard of fairness.  He forgoes justice:  When he is 
wronged, he does not retaliate.  He embraces the ideal of unconditional love which 
translates, in practice, to a willingness to be exploited.  We should note that such an 
extreme interpretation of agape has, as we might expect, had relatively few pragmatic 
converts in the history of Christianity. 
  
Is there any hope for the pure altruist, the altruist who is willing to engage an 
exploiter (the enemy) and suffer the consequences?   It does seem as if  game theory can 
take us a bit further down the road towards agape as mercy.  Interestingly, in game 
theory, when the environment is altered in ways which make it more like a human 
society, even more forgiving strategies, such as Generous TFT, are likely to perform 
well.  Ostracism, punishment of selfish individuals, memory of one’s own prior actions, 
memory of partners’ actions--all of these aid cooperative strategies (cf. Dukatkin, 1997, 
28).   Another real world consideration is the value of honesty.  The agape as mercy actor 
has a reputation which ensures others of his value as a partner.   As D.S. Wilson notes, 
citing Robert Frank, “your commitment to honesty makes you a valuable social partner, 
which can offset your vulnerability to selfishness. Saintly unconditional altruism can 
evolve in this fashion, although it seldom takes over the whole population” (Wilson, 
2002, 192).   Frank notes that to the extent that honesty traits are discernable in a person, 
the honest person has an advantage over others for social situations which require 
commitment: “The opportunist’s goal is to appear honest while availing himself of every 
prudent opportunity for personal gain.  He wants to seem like a good guy to the people 
who count . . . . If character traits are discernible however, this may not be possible. In 
order to appear honest, it may be necessary, or at least very helpful, to be honest.”  
(Frank, 1988, 18).  At best we can say that the saintly agapic actor will always do well 
when surrounded by like-minded people, and will have some social value to help protect 
him from exploiters in a mixed environment.  
In sum, the general tenor of much of the work on cooperation and altruism is that 
nice guys do indeed finish first, sometimes.  Within the context of a society with social 
controls and efficient mechanisms for sharing information about reputation, something 
between agape as fairness and agape as mercy may be the best policy.   It is worth 
adding, I think, that in industrialized democracies we seem to be witnessing a 
transformation in the mechanisms of social control.  Beyond the proliferation of new 
surveillance technologies (both visual surveillance and informational surveillance) we 
have also created efficient technologies for sharing our opinions of other reputations for 
fairness and honesty.   As information becomes more available, individual and cooperate 
reputations become more valuable, creating a stronger disincentive for anti-social 
behavior.  Ironically, as technology progresses we may be inching closer to mimicking 
ancestral environments in which one’s reputation was of paramount importance.  One 
false move on Ebay, as we all know, and millions of potential cooperators can be easily 
and effectively notified. 
Thus far we have not addressed the question of motive.  I would like to once 
again rely on Sober and Wilson to point out that successful strategies mentioned above do 
not necessarily entail any theory of human motivation.  Despite the fact that they are 
often used to confirm the presupposition of psychological egoism (that claim that all 
motives are irreducibly selfish), they are consistent with at least one alternate theory of 
human motivation--motivational pluralism--which claims that human beings do 
sometimes have irreducibly altruistic or other-regarding desires.   Success does not 
necessarily imply selfishness.   
The question Sober and Wilson ask is, “Given the advantageous nature of 
altruistic behavior for the group and, under certain conditions, for the individual, what 
mechanism(s) for this advantageous behavior was (were) most likely to evolve?  Sober 
and Wilson argue that psychological altruism may have evolved as one proximate 
mechanism for reproductive fitness.  It may be that genuinely altruistic desires could have 
evolved because this mechanism was evolutionarily advantageous. Why this mechanism 
as opposed to merely instrumental altruism?  Because amongst the possible proximate 
mechanisms which could have been selected to produce the pro-social behavior that is 
beneficial, a redundancy of independent hedonistic and altruistic concerns for others 
would have been the most reliable mechanism.  Since genuine altruism (altruism as an 
ultimate end) is a more reliable proximate mechanism for producing advantageous 
behavior than egoism alone (altruism only as an instrumental desire), then genuine 
altruism may very well have evolved in conjunction with egosim.  Since two proximate 
mechanisms are better than one, and since psychological altruism is a more direct 
indicator of how others are doing, there is reason to believe what seems commonsensical, 
that people have both altruistic and egoistic motives.  The result is Sober and Wilson’s 
motivational pluralism, which denies that altruistic motives are entirely instrumental all 
the time.   
Much work has been done to explain the evolution of cooperative behavior.  
Obviously, this sketch just scratches the surface.  But work performed with the intent of 
explaining how cooperation could evolve amongst psychological egoists proves nothing 
about the actual motives.  If there is reason to believe that psychological altruism could 
have evolved as one proximate mechanism along with egoism, the arguments which point 
out the success of cooperative behaviors can be used, ironically, to help undermine the 
basic assumption that all motives are ultimately egositic.  
 
The Pragmatic argument for pro-social behavior 
 
It is said that the sign of a good compromise is that neither side is happy.  I 
suspect that by this standard the pragmatic approach succeeds wonderfully.  I suspect that 
representatives from both traditions invoked in the above discussion will have serious and 
understandable reservations with my pragmatic compromise.  For the devoted Christian, 
reducing belief in the Christian God, the embodiment of agape, to a number of beneficial 
consequences for behavior seems to impoverish the tradition immeasurably.   Does not 
Paul write, “If I give everything I have to feed the poor . .. but have not love, I gain 
nothing (1 Cor 13:2-3)?   When agape is recommended as a recipe for biological success, 
has not something gone horribly awry?  Biologists, I suspect, may be uneasy with my 
brief and selective account of game theory and my choice to rely at times on Multi-Level 
Selection theory. 
The arguments above, however, need not merely be appeals to self interest, 
though they surely do point out the advantageous consequences of agapic behavior in 
certain contexts.   They may appeal, independently, to both egoistic and altruistic 
components of the human psyche.   Pointing out the successfulness of pro-social 
strategies is not necessarily an appeal to crass egoism.  It may be an appeal to dual 
motivations  This said, however, there may be cases in which such an egoistic appeal is 
still warranted.  Recall the context of our analysis. The pragmatic alternative to the quest 
for philosophical foundations is performed with the intent to answer the urgent question 
“How shall I live?”   Just as Sober and Wilson appeal to the “Two are better than one 
principle”  (Sober and Wilson, 1988, 307) in their case for altruism, so do I appeal to this 
principle in my case for answering this important question.  Two independent arguments 
for pro-social behavior are better than one.  If they each follow from different sets of 
premises—or appeal to different sides of us--then all the better.   Limitations do exist for 
this method, but I do not think it necessary to apologize for them.  As theorists, we are 
right to be skeptical of compromise.   But for practical purposes we are faced with an 
urgency that makes compromise at times necessary.  We must each decide how we are to 
conduct ourselves in the world.  The pragmatic approach to pro-social behavior points out 
that acting on behalf of the other is, in most cases that we would likely encounter, 
recommended on both theological and biological grounds, both metaphysical and 
naturalistic premises.   It can be agreed upon in the absence of deeper philosophical 
foundations.   
And, perhaps most importantly, the pragmatic approach to pro-social behavior 
provides one with a compelling pedagogical tool.  The fact is that fewer and fewer 
students will accept purely theological or philosophical arguments for ethical principles.  
The best argument for adopting pro-social ethics used to be the reality of the some 
metaphysical ethical foundation, perhaps the reality of a deity.  The current wave of 
public religiosity in America notwithstanding, I believe that as educators we need more 
persuasive tools for fostering pro-social behavior than arguing merely from metaphysical 
foundations.  This strategy has simply become unpersuasive.  I argue for an effective 
redundancy in pedagogical method for bringing about pro-social behavior.  It is true that 
biological premises cannot take us all the way to the ethical principle that is, in various 
articulations, at the heart of numerous world religions.  But we should realize as 
educators that more and more young people see the lack of evidence for the metaphysical 
as a positive argument against pro-social behavior.  More and more young people assume 
that if there is no metaphysical foundation for ethics then there is no foundation 
whatsoever for ethics.   Recommending pro-social behavior on both theological and 
naturalistic grounds is the most persuasive tool that I have found as an educator.  It 
allows the student to answer an urgent and answerable question---How shall I live?—
without answering the more speculative and difficult question, “Is this all there is?”  If it 
is indeed the case that there truly are theological grounds to agapic love, I suspect that we 
could do worse than give a confused and thoughtful young person advice that has saved 
many from a life of addiction and despair:  “When all else fails, fake it ‘till you make it.”   
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